Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

Albert A. Cecil v. LaVera C. Cecil, Eliza C.
Butterfield, and Walker Bank and Trust Co. : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Romney, Boyer and Ronnow; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cecil v. Cecil, No. 9229 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3640

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE O·F UTAH

Fl

ALBERT A. CECIL,
Plaint~ff and Respondent,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STA T'E O·F UTAH

ALBERT A. CECIL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.LaVERA C. CECIL, ELIZA C. BU·TTERFIELD, as Guardian of the
person of LaVera C. Cecil, and
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMpANY, a corporation, as Guardian
of the Estate of LaVera C. Cecil,
an Incompetent,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
9229

RESPO·NDENT''S· BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FkCTS
Respondent adopts Appellant's Statement of Facts
excepting that wording which is patently argument.
Since this cause sounds in equity, we append to Appellant's statement, for purposes of giving the Court ~
fuller picture, the following data: From November of
1953, when Respondent and La\Tera C. Cecil were diSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vorced, until June of 1959, when Respondent learned
of LaVera C. Cecil's January 1959 marriage to Darwin
C. Richardson (R. 62) resp.ondent Albert A. Cecil paid,
pursuant to the divorce decree herein $85.00 monthly to
Walker Bank & Trust Company on behalf of LaVera
C. Cecil as alimony. In June 1959 he was ap·parently one
month in arrears on said payments (R. 66). Walker Bank
& Trust Company, guardian of LaVera C. Cecil's estate,
collected said monthly payments from Respondent for
four months subsequent to January 1959, after it had
learned of the January 6, 1959 marriage of LaVera C.
Cecil to Darwin C. Richardson (R. 71). Neither the Bank
nor Eliza C. Butterfield, the personal guardian of LaV era C. ·Cecil, notified Respondent of the marriage (R.
71).
LaVera C. 'Cecil, at all times pertinent herein, lived
apart from her guardian (R. 59); bought her own food
and clothes (R. 63); contracted for her own lodgings
(R. 64) ; made a trip by bus froin Salt Lake City, Utah,
to Chicago, Illinois and return, unaccompanied (R. 60) ;
and carried on social relationships of courtship Vlith
members of the opposite sex (R. 51 and 62). She at no
time required the personal services of her personal
guardian (R. 63, 64), and the extent of the care given her
by the guardian of her estate was apparently to give her
a check periodically and to pay some doctor bills (R. 73).
She was never declared insane. She was hospitalized
in the State Hospital for treat1nent from May 10 to October 18, 1952, at which time she was released on a trial
basis. She was given a final discharge therefrom in
October, 1954 (R. 47).
2
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Respondent knew nothing of the Cecil-Richardson
1narriage nor was he advised of the annulment proceeding (Court file #121299) until some time after the decree
had been entered therein (R. 95). The annulment proceeding was not contested; it was virtually ex parte; no
showing that the mental capacity of LaVera C. ·Cecil was
tested is reflected in the record; no process or notice was
served or posted therein, and counsel for Appellants
prepared and took a written waiver and appearance in
the action from Darwin C. Richardson, who was not
otherwise rep-resented (R. 83) (See Appearance and
Waiver. ~Court File #121299). Appellants and their
counsel at all times pertinent herein knew the whereabouts of Respondent but did not advise him either of the
Cecil-Richardson marriage nor of the annulment p-roceeding ( R. 86 and 87).

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE LaVERA C. CECILDARWIN RICHARDSON MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS
NOT BINDING UPO·,N RESPONDENT.
POINT II.
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT LaVERA C.
CECIL WAS COMPETENT TO MARRY ON JANUARY 6', 1·959
IS IN FULL ACCORD WITH 1THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN TERMINATING ALIMONY, REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE JANUARY 6, 1959 MARRIAGE, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASO·N.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT IV.
THE JUDGMENT MODIFYING THE DECREE HEREIN
AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPOR·T
THEREOF ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE LaVERA C. CECILDARWIN RICHARDSON MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS
NOT BINDING UPON RESPONDENT.

By reason of the marriage of Lav' era C. Cecil on
January 6, 1959 Respondent acquired a right of action
to have the divorce decree modified to terminate alimony.
Appellants seek to deprive Respondent of this right by a
proceeding to which he was not a party and of which he
had no knowledge. The general rule that a person cannot
be deprived of a right of action in a proceeding in which
he is not a party is clearly stated as follovvs:
50 C.J.S. Judgments. Section 764: Persons having
liens on or claims to property which was the subject matter of a former action, or having r~ghts
of act~on against one or more of the partiJes thereto are not bound by the judgment if they were not
made parties to the suit, and had no right to be
heard or to appeal from the judgn1ent, although
their claims were brought into issue in such action,
or although thevr riy hts ,depend on the same transaction or facts which were litigated. (Emphasis
added.)
And in 30 A. Am. Jur. Judgments, Section 395, the
reasoning behind this doctrine is set forth:
4
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The rule denying the right to apply the doctrine
of res judicata as against strangers to a judgment
is based upon obvious principles of justice. The
reason for the rule lies in the fact that a stranger
to an action does not have the opportunity, vouchsafed to parties, to prove or ascertain the truth
of the questions in issue, and the principle that
no man's right should be prejudiced without an
opportunity of defending it.
Cases supporting this doctrine are legion. See:

Taylor v. Barker, 70 Ut. 34, 262 P. 266;
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Ut. 156, 48 P2 280
Beach v. Faust, 31 P2 1060;
Board of Commissioners of Denver v. Brettcher,
63 P2 477;
Hovey v. Bradbury, 44 Pac. 1077.
Appellants rely heavily upon Hilton v. Snyder, 37
Ut. 384, 108 P. 698. This was an action to recover dower.
Plaintiff sought to establish her marriage to Defendant,
who was then deceased, by introducing judgments in two
prior actions in which the status of her marriage to him
had been affirmed. Appellate court upheld the ruling of
the trial court, which precluded the judgments in the
prior actions from being introduced as evidence of the
marriage. The main holding in HiJlton v. Snyder, supra,
therefore, is contra to Appellant's position. Statements
quoted by Appellants from that case are, at most, dicta.
In discussing the kinds of judgments which are binding on the world the Court, in the Hilton case, supra,
referred to statutory proceedings whereby status may be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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determined and in which special notice to the public 1~
required. Of the importance of notice the court said:
But even where status may be determined by
some special proceeding, notice thereof is usually
provided for which must be given to some designated public official, or to the public generally, by
publication or the like. In this way the public
generally may be saiJd to have been brought into
court, and for that reason may be bound by the
judgment, for certain p1~;rposes at least. (Emphasis ours.)
However, the ·Court stated that it knew of no statute outlining such procedure in the State of Utah. The Court
then stated, on page 699:
In cases beween individuals, ho"\vever, where the
status is merely incidentally in issue, a judgment,
which, among other things, also fixes the status
of one or both parties, is not admissible as evidence of that fact as against strangers to that
judgment. . . . As "\\Te understand the rule which
distinguishes a status from any other element in a
case, it is this : If an action, although prosecuted
by one individual against another, is instituted for
the sole purpose of changing or declaring the
status of either one or both of the parties to the
action, then, in the absence of fraud or collusion
in obtaining the judgment, it is binding upon all
the world as well as the parties and their privies.
But, if the status is Inerely incidentally involved,
the judgment, although fixing the status of either
or both parties, is not admissible as against
strangers as evidence of the status.
In order for a judgment then to be binding upon
the world, according to Hilton v. Snyder, supra, in addi6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion to proper notice being given, the action must be instituted for the sole purpose of changing the status of a
party to the action and must be free from fraud and
collttsion. The judgment of annulment in question meets
neither of these requirements. The sole purpose of the
annulment action, rather than to change the status of the
parties, was to preserve the right of alimony of LeVera
C. Cecil:
LaVera Cecil herself asked Mr. Richards, counsel for
the Bank, about a divorce (R. 77). Richards testified
that a divorce could be had (R. 82), but decided on the
annulment "to p.rotect the estate and l\{rs. Cecil's rights"
to the alimony (R. 78, 82). We quote from the Richards
testimony (R. 82) commencing at line 26:
Q.

Now if you succeeded in having the marriage
annulled so that it was void ab initio, you
would safeguard that $85.00 a month payment, wouldn't you~

A.

That's correct. I figured that I would save
her and give her something to live on the rest
of her life instead of the public.

Q.

And that honestly was the basis of your decision (to take the annulment rather than
the divorce route) wasn't it, you 'van ted to
safeguard that money~

A. Well. I wanted to protect her estate; yes,
certainly.
Q.

It wasn't that there was any difficulty in getting a divorce~

A. No.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Status was of no concern to Mrs. Cecil or to her
·counsel Mr. Richards except as it was deemed important
to Mr. Richards in his attempts to perpetuate alimony.
The Cecil-Richardson 1narriage occurred on J anuary 6, 1959; the annulment proceeding was commenced
in mid-June, 1959. During this interval of some five
months the chief concern of Appellants and their counsel
was the preservation of LaVera C. Cecil's claim to alimony
against Respondent (R. 83). During this period of "concern" the Guardian of the estate accepted alimony payments fro1n Respondent; and although La\T era C. ·Cecil
and her personal guardian and the guardian of her estate
knew of the whereabouts of the Respondent and of his
interest in the matter, they refused to notify him of the
marriage or of the annulment action. Respondent was
not made a party to the annulment action, nor did he
know of the pendency thereof. Richardson was never
served with process, did not contest the action, and was
not present at the time of the hearing. Indeed, counsel
for Appellants took his Waiver and Appearance, in the
action.
The foregoing is persuasive of collusion and indicates an effort on the part of Appellants to do secretly
that which they feared "\vould not stand the scrutiny of
full disclosure. The legal effect of collusion in such cases
is "\Yell stated in Henley v. Faster, 220 Ala. 420, 125 So.

662, a case involving the rights of a child where her
parents had obtained a decree of annulment of their
1narriage by collusion :
8
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rrhird persons, however, not parties to the suit,
but whose equitable or legal rights are affected by
the status arising from a collusive or fraudulent
decree, may, in a wide range of cases, challenge
the same in equity. As it was well said in a
T'ennessee case, a collusive and fraudulent decree
between husband and wife is no more effective as
to the property rights of third persons than a
fraudulent deed between them.
Although the Court, in Hilton v. Snyder, supra, did
not specifically mention the necessity of an "adversary
proceeding" it did seem imperative that such must be a
requirement. Indeed, to be free from fraud and collusion
the proceeding should be adversary. If a judgment is to
achieve the status of being binding upon the world and
particularly on one who, as in this case, had a valuable
right affected by the action, opportunity to test the truth
of the allegations should have been afforded him-all of
which was lacking here.
Appellants assume that an annulment proceeding is
In rem and categorically binding, therefore, upon the
world. Actually, the most that can be said of an annulment action is that it partakes of the nature of an in rem
proceeding: 30 Am. J ur. Judgments, Section 127:
A judgment rendered in an action, the primary
purpose of which is to fix the status of individuals
or entities, is frequently spoken of as a judgment
in rem or in the nature of an in rem action.
An action in some particulars binding upon the world
and thereby partaking of an in rem nature may, as here,
not bind or adjudicate certain collateral matters or rights
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of persons not parties. Exa1nples of this are seen in
divorce cases, ordinarily in rem proceedings, but leaving
for further determination certain rights of third persons.
Thus it was held in Rediker v. Rediker ('Calif.) 221 P2

1:
As between the parties or their priVIes, a
decree of divorce is res judicata, not only of their
status with relation to each other, but also of all
issues that were litigated or that could have been
litigated therein; but as between strangers and
parties, the decree is res judicata only in that it
conclusively determines that the parties are thereafter free to remarry so far as .any relation to
each other is concerned. A decree of divorce is a
judgment in rem only to the extent that it adjudicates the future status of the parties in relation
to each other as distinguished from their preexisting st.atus.
Findings of fact cannot be rnade binding on
a stranger to the action by calZ.-£ng the proceeding
"~n rem."

The rights of an innocent second spouse or
the children of a second marriage are not diminished by the findings of fact in a proceeding
to which they were not parties and in "\vhich they
had no right to be heard. Such a holding would
not only be unreasonable, but constitutionally objectionable.
Respondent further asserts the decree of annuln1ent
is void on its face because it "\vas granted "\Yhere no statu-

10
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tory ground existed: Title 30-1-2, Utah Code Annotated
1.953 reads:
MARRIAGES PROHIBITED AND
DECLARED VOID:
(1)

With an idiot or lunatic, etc.

This is the only provision applicable, although there
are seven statements of prohibition relating to incestuous,
interracial and other marriages in the statute cited.
La Vera C. Cecil at no time pertinent herein was
nor is she now either an idiot or a lunatic. Dr. ~1:oench
testified that her I.Q. was 80 to 85 and the I.Q. of an
idiot is 50 to 60 (R. 49). In the petition in the guardianship proceedings in 1953, (No. 36053, 3rd District ~court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah) it was asserted only
that she was incompetent and unable to manage her property; see Petition for Appointment of Guardian, Civil
No. 36053. She was committed to the State Hospital for
treatment and released prior to the filing of the petition.
She entered the hospital 1fay 10, 1952, was released on
a trial basis five months later on October 18, 1952, and
finally discharged therefrom in October, 1954 (R. 47).
She was never at any time adjudged insane.
In order to have declared the marriage void, not
merely voidable, the court must have found, in this instance, that she \vas an idiot or lunatic, terms having
equivalent meanings. l\1ere mental incompetence is not
a ground for annulment in Utah.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Implicit in the divorce proceedings herein and the
guardianship proceedings referred to above is that the
chief concern of all persons involved at the time of the
incompetency hearing was to be able to pass title to the
real p·rop·erty owned by the parties, without any question
of legal capacity on LaVera Cecil's part. Her mental
status or competency per se, were not of moment apart
from the problem of title to the property.
Reference is made under this point to the law discussed in detail at point II post, in connection with the
mental capacity requisite to marry.
Additionally, the annulment proceeding is void on
its face, in that the action was brought by the personal
guardian rather than by one of the parties to the marriage. The Court therefore acquired no jurisdiction.
The Utah statute is as follows:
30-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: AVOIDANCE OR AFFIR~1AN·CE IN COURT OF
EQUITY: When doubt is felt as to the validity of
a marriage, either party 1nay in a court of equity,
demand its avoidance or affirmance ...

We have found no case in Utah construing the foregoing statute in this regard. \"""irtually the same statute
is found in the State of l\faine, ,,,.hich reads as follows:
vVhen the validity of a Inarriage is doubted either
party may file a libel as for divorce: and the
court shall decree the annuln1ent or affirmance
according to the proof. (Revised Statutes of
Maine, Chapter 60, Par. 18.)

12
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The wording here is virtually identical in its operative parts as ours. A case construing the Maine statute
is Winslow v. Tray, 53 Atlantic 1008:

IIELD: Where a Guardian was the petitioner the
petition gave the Court no jurisdiction, on the
premise that it was the petition of the Guardian
and not that of the husband. . . . The statute f-:ays
that either party may file a libel as for divorce.
Here neither party to the marriage filed the libel;
the decree was made upon the libel or petition
of the guardian only. Upon this ground, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to annul the
marriage and the decree was void.
And in Pence v. Aughe, 101 Indiana 317, a suit by a
guardian to annul a marriage on the ground that his
incompetent was not capable of entering into the marriage, the court said :
This latter section of the statute is the only one,
so far as we are advised, that authorizes such a
suit or proceeding (annulment on account of insanity or idiocy) as the one at bar; and, in the
absence of such statutory provisions, it is very
certain we think, that no such suit or proceeding
could be maintained. Under these statutory provisions the question arises, and, in so far as the
sufficiency of the complaint is concerned, this is
the controlling question in this case: can such a
suit or proceeding be instituted or maintained by
or in the name of any person, other than the person specified in the statute as "The Incapable
Party'' : We are of the opinion that this question
must be answered in the negative.
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POINT II.
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT LaVERA C.
CECIL WAS COMPETENT TO MARRY ON JANUARY 6-, 1'959
IS IN FULL ACCOR.D WITH THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
1

La.Vera C. Cecil was never adjudicated insane
as contended by counsel. Hence, argument that such
adjudication is prima facie proof of unsoundness of
mind at the time of her marriage is of no weight. Nor
does a guardianship created because a person lacks
mental competence to deal with her property, as here,
create any barrier to marriage.
Two Utah cases, Hatch v. Hatch, 46 U. 218, and
0'Reilly v. McLean, 84 U. 551, in interpreting our Incompetent Persons statute, 75-13-20 U.C.A. 1953, formerly 102-13-20 hold that this statute does not alter the ordinary test of contractual capacity which is "whether party
contracting had sufficient mental faculties to understand
the subject, nature, and consequence of the contract.''
·Counsel's reference to 29 Am. Jur. Par. 67 on Insane
Persons and their ability to contract is therefore inapplicable.
Under Utah marriage laws there is no prohibition
of marriage because a party is under a guardianship.
At common law, persons under guardianship could marry
and the general rule was that the n1arriage of a n1ale
ward terminated the guardianship of his person but not
of his estate, "\vhile the 1narriage of a female "\Yard terininated the guardianship entirely. (28 ·C.J., Guardianship,
1097, WOERNER, GUARDIANSHIP 33-l- et seq.)

14
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We will treat the two subheadings suggested by
counsel's brief, although not so designated therein, as
follows:

1. Effect of pr1or adjudication of incompetency
on a person's present ability to marry.
2.

General mental capacity requisite to a valid

rnarr1age.

1. Re: Effect of p,r1or adjudication of incolnpetency: 55 C.J .S. Section 12:
One for whom a guardian, committee or curator
has been appointed is not necessarily incapable of
contracting marriage; it depends on whether or
not he has the mental capacity to contract marriage.
Among the cases cited in support of this view 1s
Roether v. Roether, W,isconsin, 191 N.W. 576. The case
is reported in 28 A.L.R. 631 as the basic case in an annotation entitled "Mental Capacity to l\{arry.'' The case
holds that where the defendant had been adjudged an
incompetent, and a guardian for his person and estate
appointed, which guardianship \vas in existence at the
time of his marriage, he was not incapacitated from
1narrying on that account. Also, in Banker v. Banker, 63
N.Y. 409, it was held:
Where a man has been adjudged of unsound mind,
and afterwards while under guardianship contracts a marriage, it does not seem, independently
of statute, that this is proof of a \Vant of mental
capacity to contract the marriage.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The law seems clear that in the absence of statute
prohibiting a ward of a guardianship from marrying, the
guardianship per se is no bar.
2. Re: General mental capacity requisite to a valid
marriage.
At 35 Am. Jur. Section 18, under the heading: Tests
of Existence of Capacity in Creation of the JM~arital Status or Relationship, we read:
It may be stated generally that no greater, if as
much, mental capacity is requisite to make binding
a matrimonial contract than is requisite for ordinary business contracts. It has been frequently
laid down broadly that mental incapacity to enter
into a marriage exists whenever there is such
mental incapacity as to disable one from entering
into contracts generally or as to disable one from
understanding the contract, its nature and probable consequences, but ... marriage depends to a
great extent on sentiment, attachment and affection which persons with weaker, as well as those
with stronger, intellects feel, and it does not depend to the extent that ordinary contracts do on
the exercise of clear reason, discernment and
sound judgment. It is accordingly held by some
authorities that a person may have sufficient
mental capacity to contract a valid marriage although he may not have mental capacity to contract generally.
In the Roether case, supra, it was held: "A marriage
by one having understanding and mental capacity to realize what is then being done and consenting thereto i~
valid." 'Tinje, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in delivering the opinion of the Court in the case
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and, after discussing at length the capacity to marry
said:
Applying these rules of law to the present case,
we find that the inquiry narrows down to the
establishinent of the fact that whether or not ...
when the 1narri,age with plaintiff took place, the
defendant had mental capacity sufficvent to
understand the nature of the contract and consent thereto. (Emphasis ours.)
It is the italicized portion of the above which counsel
read to Dr. L. G. Moench at the trial as the final question
with respect to LaVera ~Cecil's mental capacity to enter
into the marriage. (R. 52)

Q.

I'm going to ask you the final definitive question: When LaVera C. Cecil stood in Elko
with Darwin Richardson before the Justice
of the Peace, do you believe . . . I am now
reading from a book . . . "when the marriage
took place, do you believe she had mental
capacity sufficient to understand the nature
of the contract of marriage and that she consen ted thereto f'

A.

(Dr. L. G. Moench) Yes, I think she did.

This was the last question and answer on cross examination. Mr. Richards on re-direct asked these questions and received these answers:

Q. Now, Doctor, when you state that she had
mental competency to understand the nature
of the marriage, do you mean by that that she
just understood that she was getting married
or that she understood all of the complications and involvements of a married life and
her financial support and so forth~.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

She understood some of the complications,
at least she reviewed with me some of the
things she thought of at that time. I think
she knew she was getting married and she
knew there were some complications of getting married. She reviewed the financial
position of the second husband. She revi,ewed
hvs work recor.d or lack of work record, his
pension and things like that.

Q.

And do you think she understood fully those
situations~

A. No sir, I don't think she understood fully.
I don't think any of us do, if I may . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Dr. Moench was the expert relied upon by Appellants for opinion that LaVera Cecil was not competent
to marry. He gave that opinion on direct examination
in answer to counsel's leading question:
Q.

Now I believe in your opinion that you stated
that from 1952 on that she would not be competent~

A.

Yes, in my opinion. (Lines 13, 14, 15, R. 48)

But the Doctor, in resp·onse to questions from counsel on cross examination and from the Court, revealed
it was his opinion that standards higher than those required by the law should be applied to candidates for
marriage.
His definitive answer to Respondent's definitive
question, as reported in full above, that LaVera Cecil
had mental capacity to understand the nature of the
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contraet of marriage and that she consented thereto
~hould be sufficient to guide us here.
~ince

the evidence is reviewable here, we refer briefly to these data which were undoubedly as persuasive
upon the trial court as the Doctor's opinion:
1. At no time since the guardianship did LaVera
C. Cecil apparently require the guidance or assistance
of her personal guardian. (See all of Butterfield Testimony, particularly:
As far as knowing anything about what she
did, I didn't know. (Lines 28, 29, R. 57)

Q. Did she ever follow your advice or direction
since your being appointed guardian~
A.

No, she always did as she pleased. (R. 58)

She has always lived away from me. (Line
29, R. 59)
Mr. Ronnow: Well Mrs. Butterfield, from 1953 in
the fall when you were appointed her personal guardian until today, you don't buy her
food or clothes or take care of her, do you~
The vVitness: No. I do not. (Lines 24-29, R. 63)
I have never bothered her. I have let her do
just as she pleased. (R. 64) )
2. She lived alone at various hotels or rooming
houses. She contracted for these lodgings unaided by her
personal guardian or the bank. (R. 63-64) She bought
her own food and clothing and other necessaries, un.
aided.
3. She made a trip alone to Chicago, Illinois and return from Salt Lake City. Her mother and personal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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j

guardian, Mrs. Butterfield, "had no real concern that
she was going to get hurt or anything like that" on the
trip. (R. 60)
4. She carried on a courtship with Richardson for
four months prior to marrying him, during which time
she reviewed his financial condition, his work record and
his pension. (R. 51, 52)
5. She philosophised that marrying Richardson
might erase a sense of religious guilt she felt from having
lived with him on a sexual basis. (R. 51)

6. In Elko, at the time of her marriage, she had
"some question in her mind as to whether or not she
should get married." She studied this and decided she
would get married. (R. 52) She consented to the marriage of her own volition.
7. Her quarrels with Walker Bank and Trust Company over money and her stories of lost purses, etc. (R.
68) in order to get them to give her more money suggest
intelligent planning and craft as much as the juvenile
attitude Ap·pellants contend for.
She was mentally comp·etent to contract, she kne'v
and understood what she was doing when she married
Richardson, and the guardianship is no bar.
POINT III.
THE CO'URT DID NOT ERR IN TERMINATING ALIMONY, REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE JANUARY 6, 1959 MARRIAGE, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASO·N.
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In .A.ustad v. Austad, 2 Ut. 2d 49, 269 P2 284, cited by
Appellants for authority that the payments of alimony
should continue, notwithstanding the validity of the marriage of La\r era 'C. Cecil, our Supreme Court has decreed
that "the burden would be upon the wife to prove'' that
the termination of alimony would be "so unconscionable
or inequitable that the court ... would decree that (she)
does not lose her right to alimony upon remarriage."
That burden simply has not been borne here. We
have no testimony whatever from LaVera C. Cecil and
very little from others as to whether or not an ''unconscionable or inequitable" result would obtain.
The Austad case has been the subject of an annotation to be found at 48 A.L.R. 2d 256. The weight of opinion therein seems best exp-ressed in Cary v. Cary, a Connecticut case, rep·orted at 152 Atl. 302. In the Cary
case the 'Court said:
The better rule which we adopt, save in the most
exceptional circumstances, draws fro1n the voluntary action of the wife in re-marrying the inferrenee that she has elected to obtain her support
from her second husband and has thereby abandoned the previous mate for her support by the
court in its awarding of alimony. Gases admitting of a variance of this r~tle will be except~onal
and rare and the burden of removing the case
from the ordinary rule is upon the wife, if the
proof of the re-marriage has been made. Reason
requires us to hold that the re-marriage of the
wife should relieve the husband of supporting the
wife of another man. (Emphasis added.)
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We refer the court to finding Number 6 of the trial
Judge wherein he describes in detail that he sees no inequitable result and that the equities favor Respondent.
(R. 101-102)
POINT IV.
THE JUDGMENT MODIFYING THE DECREE HER.EIN
AND THE FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT
THEREOF ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW.

The Judgment of modification, findings and conclusions in support thereof are in keeping with the evidence and the law, as we believe has been shown in the
argument covering Points I, II, and III.
CONCLUSION
Upon the remarriage of LaVera ·C. Cecil, Respondent had the clear right, in Equity, to have the divorce
decree modified to provide for the termination of alimony payments. Had he learned of the marriage prior
to the annulment decree he would have been successful
in a hearing to have this decree modified, even in the
face of the defense of invalidity of the marriage. This
seems clear from the result in the case at bar.
Appellants would deprive him the right to test the
validity of the marriage by prosecuting a furtive annulment proceeding, which they choose to call an in rem
action, in an effort to cut off Respondent's rights. The
action was not one in rem as shown herein, nor did
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Appellants' procedure comport with the rigid requirements of Equity, whose blessing they now invoke.
Clean hands are Respondent's, not Appellants. The decree of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY, BOYER and RO,NNOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff a;nd
Respondent
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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